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FAR FROM THE MADDING CROWD: CROWDFUNDING A
SMALL BUSINESS REORGANIZATION
ABSTRACT
Crowdfunding, the act of raising small sums of money from a large pool of
people over the internet, represents a new way for small businesses to raise
capital. Thousands of entrepreneurs have used online portals such as
Indiegogo.com or Kickstarter.com to fund their business ventures. While the
results of those campaigns vary wildly, the market itself has thrived, and
currently sees an annual investment of $90 billion. As more businesses turn to
crowdfunding, the likelihood that crowdfunding will come into conflict with the
Bankruptcy Code increases.
This Comment proposes a framework by which bankruptcy courts can
analyze cases involving non-equity crowdfunding and small business debtors.
The framework is best described in the context of four questions likely to be
raised by the creditors of a crowdfunding debtor. First, creditors may seek to
cancel a crowdfunding campaign once the debtor has filed for bankruptcy.
Section 365, and the concept of contingent interests, will both allow the debtor
to overcome these objections and incentivize debtors to withhold them in the first
place. Second, creditors may object to the use of estate property in the campaign
itself. Section 363 provides courts with a means to evaluate these objections and
debtors with a means to defeat them. Third, creditors may seek to prevent a
debtor from taking on new debt by fulfilling its post-petition crowdfunding
obligations. Section 364, however, suggests that those obligations should be
considered administrative expenses. Finally, creditors may oppose confirmation
of a reorganization plan predicated on a successful crowdfunding campaign. If
such a plan is carefully designed, however, it can satisfy § 1129(a)(11)’s
feasibility standard.
Bankruptcy Courts can and should evaluate these cases with an eye towards
promoting trust in the crowdfunding sector. By explaining the proposed
framework through the eyes of a fictional small business, this Comment argues
that courts can answer creditors’ questions in a way that both satisfies the twin
aims of bankruptcy and protects the integrity of the crowdfunding system.
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PREFACE
Debt, as a general rule, is undesirable. Nevertheless, as the economy
continues to grow in unexpected directions, debt remains a constant part of
almost any market.1 Small businesses treading water in that oft-raging sea of
equity often discover that, as Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote in 1860, “money
often costs too much.”2 Failure to raise capital, then, becomes the breaker upon
which so many entrepreneurs ultimately crash.
Crowdfunding represents one means by which individuals and businesses
can avoid the pitfalls of debt-based capital formation.3 Crowdfunding is, in its
simplest form, “a financing model that relies on collecting small sums of money
from many people over the Internet.”4 The process is straightforward. Instead of
giving up equity to a bank or encumbering more of their property with liens,
entrepreneurs can tap into their consumer base for needed capital. Using online
portals such as Kickstarter.com or Indiegogo.com, the entrepreneur, and
thousands like her, simply lists her project online for the masses to evaluate. If
an individual likes the project, and wishes to see it thrive, he can contribute funds
and become a “backer.” In addition to knowing that they have contributed to
something they are passionate about, backers are often rewarded with special
access, recognition, or items to commemorate their benevolence.
These contributions are flowing in at unexpected rates. According to Forbes,
the crowdfunding sector will see investment of $90 billion per year by 2017, and
has likely already overcome venture capital in terms of average yearly
investment.5 Small businesses are playing their part in this surge because
“[c]rowdfunding addresses a well-known gap in financing for companies and
projects with prospects too uncertain to qualify for bank loans as well as business
plans too small or esoteric to attract angel investors or venture capital funding.”6

1
At least one commentator has gone further to argue that our “debt-based economy” predates even the
original 13 colonies. K-Sue Park, Money, Mortgages, and the Conquest of America, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
1006, 1014 (2016).
2
See Rob Berger, Top 100 Money Quotes of All Time, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/robertberger/2014/04/30/top-100-money-quotes-of-all-time/#534e652675e7.
3
Throughout this Comment, the term “debt-based capital formation” is used as shorthand for traditional
methods of capital formation, including loans, mortgages and venture capital. The “pitfalls” referred to here are
those that usually come with attaching new obligations to a business: lost equity, interest, and opportunity cost
being the most recognizable.
4
Amy Cortese, Pennies from Many, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 25, 2011.
5
Chance Barnett, Trends Show Crowdfunding to Surpass VC in 2016, FORBES (May 9, 2015),
http://onforb.es/1GbtdwP.
6
See generally Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Se(c)(3): A Catalyst for Social Enterprise
Crowdfunding, 90 IND. L.J. 1091, 1101 (2015).
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On Indiegogo, the “small business” category is filled with well over 250
campaigns7 crowdfunding for everything from opening a hot yoga studio in
Richmond, Virginia ($5,750 raised)8 to relocating a modular “co-living space”
in Los Angeles ($29,307 raised).9 The allure of tapping into the crowd for capital
has also been felt in larger corporate circles. In 2015, Sony, an international
company with $148 billion in assets, announced that the third installment of its
long dormant video game series Shenmue would be funded via Kickstarter.10
Despite some intense media skepticism and criticism, Sony raised $800,000 in
the first half hour of the campaign.11
Unfortunately, small businesses often have a rough go in today’s economy—
in 2016, for example, an average filing-day saw 151 businesses file for
bankruptcy.12 As the amount of businesses using crowdfunding platforms grows,
so too will the amount of crowdfunding businesses that fail. More failed
businesses funded by crowdfunding campaigns will logically lead to more
businesses filing for bankruptcy that still owe promises to backers. These
failures will ultimately bring crowdfunding into conflict with chapter 11 of the
Code.13
INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship has only recently addressed crowdfunding from a
bankruptcy perspective. In a 2013 American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) Journal
feature titled “Crowdfunding” a Chapter 11 Plan, one commentator wrote that
while “[c]rowdfunding has the potential to create new options for small business
debtors . . . if and when these new options arise in the context of bankruptcy
cases, they will inevitably raise a host of questions.”14 This Comment will
address four of those questions, each likely to be brought by creditors of a small
business debtor. It will not suggest how a court should rule in any particular
7

INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/explore/smallbusiness#/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
Humble Haven Yoga, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/humble-haven-yogacommunity-health/x/15370259#/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
9
Save
Podshare,
INDIEGOGO,
https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/save-podshare-end-worldloneliness/x/15370259#/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
10
See Dalton Cooper, E3 2015: ‘Shenmue 3’ Announced, To Be Funded on Kickstarter, GAMERANT
https://gamerant.com/shenmue-3-kickstarter-e3-2015/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
11
Cf. The Know, Shenmue 3 a Scam?! You decide, YOUTUBE (June 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=vl4NzY9umlU.
12
37,823 businesses filed for bankruptcy in 2016; 6,591 of those filings at least started in Chapter 11.
January 2017 Bankruptcy Statistics- Commercial Filings, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-statistics.
13
As of the time of writing, no bankruptcy court opinions concerning crowdfunding have been published.
14
David McGrail, Crowdfunding A Chapter 11 Plan, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30–31 (2013).
8
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case; as will be discussed, such inquiries are rather fact intensive. The Comment
will, however, propose a framework for how a court can decide (1) whether the
campaign should be cancelled outright upon filing, (2) whether a debtor can use
property of the estate to crowdfund, (3) whether promised rewards can be paid
without upsetting eventual distribution, and (4) whether a chapter 11 plan can
be confirmed if it relies on crowdfunding as a means of capital formation.
This Comment will suggest that, with regards to crowdfunding, the Code
need not be reinvented, and the tools to analyze these four questions are already
present in the judge’s toolbox. The threshold question of the crowdfunding
campaign’s continuation is addressed by § 365, which concerns executory
contracts, and § 541’s allowance of contingent interests as property of the estate.
As discussed infra in parts III (B) and (C), these two sections should allow
debtors to continue their campaigns after filing for chapter 11. Part III (D)
discusses how § 363 will authorize debtors-in-possession to use property of the
estate to crowdfund.15 Part III (E) proposes that, because rewards promised to
backers are post-petition burdens, § 364 can allow debtors to satisfy those
obligations. Finally, part III (F) suggests that crowdfunding can satisfy
§ 1129(a)(11)’s feasibility requirement, and that reliance on such a campaign
need not be fatal to a plan’s confirmation. That such a framework is already
present in the Code means that courts do not need to react impulsively in
response to crowdfunding 16
Broadly speaking, there are two types of crowdfunding: equity
crowdfunding and non-equity crowdfunding. While this Comment concerns the
former, the latter will be discussed by way of comparison, especially in part II
(A), with regards to the 2012 “Jumpstart Our Business Startups” (“JOBS”)
Act.17 Equity crowdfunding platforms are akin to virtual stock exchanges. Both
individual and institutional investors can log in to an equity crowdfunding portal,
such as Microventures.com or Equitynet.com, and purchase shares in

15

As discussed in Part III(C), “use” is a term of art in the context of § 363.
Outside of bankruptcy, crowdfunding fits in a niche between securities and contracts. See Reza Dibaji,
Crowdfunding Delusions, 12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 15, 16 (2016) (arguing that “existing crowdfunding sites
carefully manage around a fundamental ambiguity in the securities laws—a surprisingly fuzzy definition of what
a ‘security’ is”).
17
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012). Some commentators argue that “equity crowdfunding” is a misnomer
for the marketplace that the JOBS Act helped to create. Cf. Ryan Caldbeck, Equity Crowdfunding is Dead, TECH
CRUNCH (May 16, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/16/equity-crowdfunding-is-dead/ (“This isn’t
“crowdfunding” because there needn’t be any “crowd”—the marketplace is a conduit for the right investors and
entrepreneurs to come together.”). For the purposes of this Comment, the term will suffice.
16
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companies.18 Backers on these platforms become shareholders, and because they
represent a wide swath of the investing community, companies seeking their
investment can cater to a wider set of interests than they would in a traditional
investment setting.19 In bankruptcy, these backers would fall behind secured and
unsecured creditors in chapter 11 proceedings.20
This Comment focuses on non-equity-based crowdfunding, which
represents a more attractive proposition to many entrepreneurs because, as the
name would suggest, it does not require a business owner to give up equity or
shares.21 As described in Part II (B), a business using a non-equity crowdfund
can theoretically raise capital by trading on nothing more than the goodwill of
its customers. Further, non-equity campaigns on platforms that do not allow
securities offerings, such as Kickstarter.com22 or GoFundMe.com,23 are
governed by general contract law, which is more accessible to small business
owners than securities law.24 As non-equity crowdfunding contracts are
governed by contract law, they are simpler to evaluate in bankruptcy. For
example, in a non-equity crowdfunding case, § 1145’s securities law exemptions
need not be considered.25
When a business involved in crowdfunding files for bankruptcy, three
unique qualities of crowdfunding schemes may pose challenges for bankruptcy
courts.26 First, many platforms use an “all or nothing” system wherein funds are
not released to project organizers until their “goals,” as filed with the platform

18
If it deals in equity, a crowdfunding intermediary must register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as a broker or as a funding portal and become a member of a national securities association
(FINRA). See FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about/funding-portals-we-regulate (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
19
Caldbeck, supra note 17.
20
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, What Every Investor Should Know: Corporate
Bankruptcy (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/bankrupt.htm.
21
For a discussion of the limits of equity crowdfunding, see Deborah L. Jacobs, The Trouble with
Crowdfunding, FORBES (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/04/17/the-troublewith-crowdfunding/#40f823225f45) (“The risks, burdens and limitations of [equity] crowdfunding render it
almost completely useless.”).
22
See Rules, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/rules (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (“Projects
can’t offer financial incentives like equity or repayment.”).
23
GoFundMe only allows pure donations. See Common Questions, GO FUND ME, https://www.
gofundme.com/questions (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
24
See 2 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 14.01 (2016) (“Similarly, the rules of conduct on social
networks, online games, blogs and other websites generally are determined by contract.”).
25
11 U.S.C. § 1145 (2012).
26
For simplicity, this Comment will generally use the term “crowdfunding” to refer to non-equity
crowdfunding. Similarly, a crowdfunding campaign can be referred to as a “crowdfund,” and monies received
through said campaign are “crowdfunds.”
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and advertised to prospective backers, have been met.27 If the goals are not met,
the campaign receives nothing. One could imagine a scenario where a debtor has
raised 90% of its goal on the date of filing for chapter 11. Should the court force
the campaign’s cessation to appease risk averse creditors? Or should the court
allow it to continue in the hopes that a successful crowdfunding campaign can
provide the debtor with funds for either its day one obligations or plan crucial
operating capital? In part III (B) and (C), this Comment will answer these
questions by focusing on two concepts. First, § 365 (executory contracts)
provides a basis upon which a court can allow a crowdfunding campaign to
continue without input or objection from creditors. Second, § 541’s inclusion of
“contingent interests” in property of the estate creates an incentive for creditors
to withhold objections in the first place.
The second challenge derives from how most platforms focus on “rewards
based” campaigns, wherein project organizers offer incentives to backers, such
as special access to the design process or early access to the backed item.28
Should a company engaging in such a campaign file for chapter 11, it is
conceivable that its creditors will do anything in their power to prevent those
rewards from being both issued by the debtor and given to the backers, especially
if doing so would shrink the size of the estate. As articulated in parts III (D) and
(E), existing law, specifically §§ 363 and 364 of the Code, can provide courts
with a framework with which to evaluate the debtor’s plans.
The third challenge, as discussed in parts II(C) and III (E), is that predicting
the outcome of a crowdfunding campaign is difficult. Part III (E) addresses the
final stage of many chapter 11 analyses: confirmation. Part III (E) will suggest
that basing a reorganization on a successful crowdfunding campaign can satisfy
§ 1129(a)(11)’s feasibility standard.
Finally, this Comment will argue that bankruptcy courts can promote the
twin aims of bankruptcy—the fresh start and fair and equitable distribution—
with an eye towards protecting backer confidence in the crowdfunding system
as a whole. By doing so, courts may enable all three types of interested parties
to reap some benefit from the chapter 11 proceedings. If all goes well, backers
may receive their “rewards,” and, ideally, the knowledge that their contribution
has gone towards helping their chosen cause. Debtor companies that are allowed
27
See Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter+basics?
ref=footer (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (“Funding on Kickstarter is all-or-nothing. No one will be charged for a
pledge towards a project unless it reaches its funding goal. This way, creators always have the budget they
scoped out before moving forward.”).
28
See id.
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to continue crowdfunding during their bankruptcy case will be more likely to
make the capital improvements necessary to keep the doors open, keep up with
plan payments, and keep employees paid. Accordingly, creditors, though
prevented from raiding the crowdfund for short term gains, will be more likely
to see long-term returns as the reorganized business uses those new capital
improvements to successfully complete its chapter 11 plan. If such a result is
realized, both the bankruptcy system and the crowdfunding system, as analyzed
in part III (A), will benefit.
Like Thomas Hardy’s 1874 Novel Far from the Madding Crowd, this
Comment draws its name from Thomas Gray’s poem Elegy Written in a Country
Churchyard. Like the poem’s narrator, this Comment seeks to avoid “the
madding crowd’s ignoble strife.”29 If judges can analyze crowdfunding without
engaging in such ignoble strife, they can empower crowdfunding debtor
businesses to fully utilize the power of the crowd. The “madding crowd” need
not be feared—and can, indeed, be tamed.
I.

BACKGROUND AND LEGAL DOCTRINES

A. The JOBS Act Suggests that Congress Has Liberalized Capital Formation
Any analytical framework used by bankruptcy courts must fit within the
judiciary’s role of interpreting the laws as written by the legislature.”30 Those
laws, as Karl Llewellyn observed, “must be read in the light of some assumed
purpose.”31 This task is simpler when the courts have a statute in which to search
for a purpose. Currently, there is no federal statute or regulation pertaining to
non-equity crowdfunding.32 However, in terms of both design and intent, the

29
Thomas Gray, Elegy Written in a Country Courtyard, THOMAS GRAY ARCHIVE, http://www.
thomasgray.org/cgi-bin/display.cgi?text=elcc (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
30
As Bankruptcy Judge Hon. Thomas F. Waldron wrote for the ABI, “[i]t is essential to recall that
contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes that the purpose of statutory interpretation is to
determine Congressional intent.” Thomas F. Waldron, BAPCPA in the Courts: How Judicial Interpretation of
the New Provisions Affects Your Cases, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 19TH ANNUAL WINTER
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, 071206 ABI-CLE 15 (noting that this task has been difficult in recent years in the
bankruptcy sphere; writing, for example, “the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act []
has been repeatedly recognized by the bankruptcy community as, what in common parlance would be called, a
mess.”)
31
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about how
Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1949).
32
As Llewellyn also wrote, “[s]tatutes in pari materia must be construed together.” Because we only
have one statute at issue here (i.e., the JOBS Act, which only concerns equity crowdfunding), this canon is only
helpful in the abstract. That is, because we only have one statute, we have nothing to “construe together.” Id. at
402.
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2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the JOBS Act), while not specifically
relevant to non-equity-based crowdfunding, signals congressional support for a
liberalization of how small businesses raise capital. If the goal of the JOBS Act
was to create avenues for capital formation, then, it is reasonable to infer that
Congress’ “assumed purpose” was to create similar avenues for existing small
businesses.33
The passage of the JOBS and CROWDFUND34 Acts signaled that, by 2012,
Washington, D.C. had seen the great power of crowdfunding as a capital
formation tool.35 In passing these Acts, Congress signaled that, in the midst of
the “Great Recession,” the federal government was ready to democratize
investment on a large scale.36 As early as 2011, the Obama Administration
signaled its support of a bill that would “make it easier for entrepreneurs to raise
capital and create jobs.”37 In his 2012 State of the Union Address, President
Obama pushed Congress to open up investment opportunities for small
businesses, saying that “Most new jobs are created in start-ups and small
businesses. So let’s pass an agenda that helps them succeed. Tear down
regulations that prevent aspiring entrepreneurs from getting the financing to
grow.”38 His remarks at the Act’s signing four months later are further
illustrative:
And for start-ups and small businesses, this bill is a potential game
changer. Right now, you can only turn to a limited group of
investors—including banks and wealthy individuals—to get funding.
Laws that are nearly eight decades old make it impossible for others to
invest. But a lot has changed in 80 years, and it’s time our laws did as
33
See JOBS Act Eases Regulatory Burdens on Capital Raising, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Apr. 2012),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/jobs-act-eases-regulatory-burdens-capital-raising
(“Primarily,
the
purpose of the JOBS Act is to help ease the regulatory burden of capital raising for startups and smaller
companies leading to increased economic growth and job creation.”).
34
The “Capital RaisingOnline While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2011” was a
companion bill to the JOBS Act that amended parts of the Securities Act of 1933 to “provide for registration
exemptions for certain crowdfunded securities. S. 2190, 112th Congress (2012).
35
See also PandoDaily, Naval Ravikant: How I Changed the Jobs Act, YouTube (Nov. 15, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ugDyaVLPj3w. Ravikant, co-founder of AngelList, an angel investing
platform, discussed in this interview how involved the crowdfunding industry was in lobbying for Securities
reform (“I spent six months of my life just calling in favors left and right.”).
36
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, “Statement of Administration
Policy-H.R. 2930” (Nov. 2, 2011) (“[the President] called for cutting away the red tape that prevents many
rapidly growing startup companies from raising needed capital, including through a “crowdfunding” exemption.
which would enable greater flexibility in soliciting relatively small equity investments.”).
37
Id.
38
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-unionaddress.
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well. Because of this bill, start-ups and small business will now have
access to a big, new pool of potential investors—namely, the American
people. For the first time, ordinary Americans will be able to go online
and invest in entrepreneurs that they believe in. 39

The legislative history behind the Act follows a similar trajectory.40 ThenRepresentative Spencer Bachus, for example, stated on the House floor that
“[Congress] must cut the red tape that prevents our small businesses and
entrepreneurs [from capital formation] . . . . They are creating the most jobs. This
legislation will give them the freedom to access capital, to hire workers, and to
grow jobs.”41
The intent to liberalize the means by which small businesses can raise capital
was also bipartisan. In the Senate, 23 Democrats joined the entire Republican
minority to pass the bill 73-26.42 In the House, the entire Republican majority
and 145 Democrats pushed the bill to President Obama’s desk, where it was
quickly signed.43 The expediency by which the bill passed both the House and
the Senate, with obvious support from the executive branch, suggests that
Washington recognized the reality that “outdated laws [were] cutting off a huge
pool of potential capital for small, private businesses that have been all but
abandoned by banks and Wall Street.”44
To be clear, the Act does not strictly apply to non-equity crowdfunding.
Among other things, it allows investors earning less than $200,000 a year with
a net worth below $1 million to invest in startups through certain online
platforms.45 Those platforms are also subject to restrictions, such as a limit of $1
39

Id.
The groundwork for President Obama’s push was arguably laid by Republican Representatives Carney
and Fincher, who introduced H.R. 3606, the Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth
Companies Act, in 2011. H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2012). That act was largely incorporated into the JOBS Act.
41
158 Cong. Rec. H1234-01 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Bachus). For differing views on
the SEC’s role in regulating this marketplace, compare R. Kevin Saunders II, Power to the People: How the
SEC Can Empower the Crowd, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 945, 945 (2014) (proposing that the SEC “initially
adopt a light regulatory approach, let the market regulate itself where practicable, and impose harsher regulation
only where necessary”) with Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90
N.C.L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2012) (concluding that “the only appropriate exemption for crowdfunding is one
conditioned on meaningful disclosures about the company and the terms of the offering.”).
42
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3606/actions (last visited
Apr. 6, 2018)
43
Final Vote Results For Roll Call 132, OFFICE OF THE CLERK (Mar. 27, 2012), http://clerk.house.gov/
evs/2012/roll132.xml.
44
Cortese, supra note 4.
45
Lucinda Shen, Now Anybody Can Try Being a Venture Capitalist, FORTUNE (May 16, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/05/16/title-iii-jobs-act/.
40
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million on investment during any twelve-month period.46 For our purposes, then,
the JOBS Act should be evaluated considering intent rather than substance.
Given that Congress has shown a preference for making equity-based
crowdfunding easier, it is likely that Congress will eventually show a similar
preference for non-equity-based crowdfunding as well. Non-equity-based
crowdfunding carries less risks than its equity-based cousin.47 More importantly,
non-equity crowdfunding is considerably simpler than equity crowdfunding;
while the former is essentially a one-time transaction (i.e., money is exchanged
for rewards), the latter creates a continuous relationship governed by securities
law.48 If Congress was willing to liberalize equity-based crowdfunding for the
masses, then, it is logical that Congress would be equally willing to open up
avenues for non-equity-based campaigns for smaller businesses. Bankruptcy
courts can, and indeed should, keep this in mind when hearing cases dealing with
crowdfunding campaigns.
B. Crowdfunding through the Eyes of a Small Business
Theory can only take one so far before practicality demands some attention.
Before explaining the framework that courts can use to evaluate crowdfunding
small businesses, it would be helpful to explain who those small businesses are
likely to be. For reasons described in this section, small, local, and respected
businesses, such as family restaurants, are most likely to crowdfund
successfully. In the interest of simplicity, this Comment will explain its proposed
analytical framework through the eyes of a fictitious small business, owned
wholly by Mr. Al Jones, called Al’s Pizza.49 This section serves two purposes:
to introduce the reader to the type of business likely to use crowdfunding, and
to explain why those businesses can successfully do so.
46

Id.
Risks that apply to equity crowdfunding and not non-equity crowdfunding include adverse or
overinflated valuations, added compliance and corporate governance costs, and a low initial rate of success;
during the early stages of equity crowdfunding in the UK, “one in five companies that raised money on equity
crowdfunding platforms between 2011 and 2013 had gone bankrupt.” Mary Childs, Fears That Crowdfunding
Poses Risks for Small Investors, FIN. TIMES (June 1, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e7756dae-2740-11e68ba3-cdd781d02d89.
48
See generally Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.
309, 350 (arguing that the JOBS Act, and equity crowdfunding generally, does not do enough to increase
“historically marginalized actors’ access to new crowdfunding markets.”)
49
A pizza restaurant was chosen because few things are more ubiquitous than the local pizza joint.
Between 2007 and 2010, “[a]bout 1 in 8 Americans consumed pizza on any given day.” Donna G. Rhodes et al.,
Consumption of Pizza: What We Eat in America, NHANES 2007-2010, USDA FOOD SURVEYS RESEARCH
GROUP DIETARY DATA BRIEF NO. 11 (Feb. 2014), https://www.ars.usda.gov/ARSUserFiles/80400530/pdf/
DBrief/11_consumption_of_pizza_0710.pdf. Al’s Pizza is fictitious, and no identification with actual restaurants
or persons is intended or should be inferred.
47
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In § 101, the Code defines, in relevant part, a “small business debtor” as “a
person engaged in commercial or business activities . . . that has aggregate
noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debts as of the date of the filing
of the petition or the date of the order for relief in an amount not more than
$2,566,050.”50 For this Comment, this definition is rather over-inclusive, and it
fails to give an accurate picture of the types of businesses likely to rely on
crowdfunding.51 Likewise, the United States Small Business Administration
lists 813 “sub-sections” of small business types.52 This Comment’s proposed
framework would apply to any small business so classified. However,
manufacturing and service companies that generally do not interact with the
public are less likely to utilize crowdfunding.53 A manufacturer of sporting
goods, for example, will not have the same “community” of loyal retail
customers as the family-owned store selling those products.54 Put differently,
more traditional “mom and pop” stores, such as restaurants and dry cleaners, are
much more likely to have some social capital to tap into with a crowdfunding
campaign.55
Social capital is the key to crowdfunding, and small businesses are in a
unique position to exploit that capital. With regards to small businesses, studies
have described the importance of social capital, “including social capital from
family and friends and including social capital mediated by social networks.”56
Small businesses can create social capital in several ways: by becoming involved
in local events, offering personal contacts with customers, and returning profit
back into their communities. These businesses are therefore uniquely poised to
50

11 U.S.C. § 101(51)(D)(A) (2012).
Though, as discussed supra with regards to Sony, crowdfunding is certainly not limited to small
businesses. Supra Part I.
52
13 C.F.R. § 121.201 (2012).
53
See Massimo G. Columbo, Chiara Franzoni & Cristina Rossi-Lamastra, Internal Social Capital and
the Attraction of Early Contributions in Crowdfunding, 39 ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY AND PRAC. 75, 75
(2014) (internal citations omitted).
54
See generally Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, The Role of Social Capital in Financial
Development, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 526 (2004).
55
See Mark Casson & Marina Della Giusta, Entrepreneurship and Social Capital: Analysing the Impact
of Social Networks on Entrepreneurial Activity from a Rational Action Perspective, 25 INT’L SMALL BUS. J. 220,
220 (Jun. 2007) (“The concept of social capital is widely agreed to be ambiguous. It has many different
connotations, and so the scope for confusion is considerable.”). For the purposes of this Comment, social capital
can be seen in the broad sense as “the connections and shared values that exist between people and enable
cooperation. Chris Cancialosi, 4 Reasons Social Capital Trumps All, FORBES (Sep. 22, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chriscancialosi/2014/09/22/4-reasons-social-capital-trumps-all/#22b7f63c6986.
An older conception, that social capital “includes[s] information, ideas, leads, business opportunities, financial
capital, power, emotional support, goodwill, trust, and cooperation” may also be illustrative. WAYNE BAKER,
ACHIEVING SUCCESS THROUGH SOCIAL CAPITAL 25 (2000).
56
See supra, note 53, at 95 (internal citations omitted).
51
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take advantage of their social networks for financial gain. According to Pew
Research, “87% of crowdfunding donors feel that [crowdfunding] platforms
help contributors feel more connected to the products they support.”57
Applying the concept to our example business, Al’s Pizza can capitalize on
this trend by offering backers rewards that “connect” them to its products, such
as special access or branded merchandise. Further, projects designed to “help a
person in need” are the most popular type of crowdfunding campaigns, making
up 68% of the market. Of those contributions, 63% go to “a friend-of-a-friend
or acquaintance.”58 If Jones has created a social network to the extent that
customers see him as at least an acquaintance, his business has an opportunity
to exploit that network. This is good for Jones, as his business is heading towards
insolvency. Al’s business debts, including a bank lien on his pizza oven,59
unpaid rent, debt owed to suppliers,60 withheld salary for two full-time
employees, and an adverse judgment in a slip and fall case, equal $500,000.
C. Introduction to Crowdfunding Campaigns
This section describes both the crowdfunding landscape and the type of
campaign that Al’s Pizza will embark upon. Prior to the passage of the JOBS
Act in 2012, small businesses had less capital formation options than did larger
corporations.61 Even after the act passed, the U.S. Small Business
Administration wrote in July 2016 that “[s]mall businesses’ financing options
typically fall into two categories: debt and equity.”62 Debt-based financing is an
integral part of the small business landscape; 63% of all small employer
businesses have some debt,63 and, in 2012, “credit cards were one of the top
three sources of short term capital used by small businesses.”64 Jones,
understanding that any loan terms he could get would be unfavorable,65 and
57
Aaron Smith, Shared, Collaborative and On Demand: The New Digital Economy, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (May 19, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/the-new-digital-economy/.
58
Id.
59
Some time after this Comment was written, a bankruptcy judge in Atlanta suggested to the author that,
for various reasons, most trustees would abandon an industrial pizza oven. For the sake of this hypothetical, Al’s
oven can be liquidated if necessary.
60
Some of this debt will come post-petition.
61
Cortese, supra note 4.
62
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFF. OF ADVOC., Small Business Finance: Frequently Asked Questions (July
2016), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Finance-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
This analysis assumes that the costs of crowdfunding, such as time, risk of failure, and payment of
rewards, will be less than the costs of taking on a new, traditional loan, which can be substantial. “Microloans,”
for example, are provided in part by the Small Business Administration for businesses much like Al’s. Their
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unwilling to add any more liens to his property, has another option in the form
of a crowdfunding campaign. Hoping to avoid bankruptcy, and chapter 7 in
particular, Jones decides to create such a campaign on the crowdfunding portal
Indiegogo.com.66
Next assume that confirmation of Jones’ reorganization plan hinges on badly
needed improvements to the restaurant, and that the crowdfunding campaign is
the only reasonable means of paying for those improvements. The plan adds new
seating and rearranges the dining room to accommodate ten more seats at the
cost of $10,000. He could also buy an additional pizza oven, thus doubling
productivity, and reducing wait times during the lunch rush, for $15,000. Jones
reasons that these two main additions, coupled with various smaller
improvements to the restaurant, would provide him with an additional $100,000
in revenue per year.67 This increased revenue would allow Jones room to pay off
his debts over the course of perhaps six or seven years, or, should he need to file
for bankruptcy, give him more of a chance to stay out of chapter 7. With all of
this in mind, Jones sets his campaign goal at $25,000.68
Like nearly every other campaign creator on Indiegogo, Al’s will need to
offer incentives to potential backers. These incentives, known in the
crowdfunding arena as “perks” or “rewards,” can entail tangible gifts, such as
clothing, future discounts, public recognition, and special access. Rewardsbased crowdfunding does not work if the “rewards” are not significantly
inexpensive compared to the prices paid for them. Or, said another way, for a
campaign to be successful, a project organizer must make considerably more
profit from a crowdfunding transaction than they would from a traditional “sale.”
Backers know this going in to the transaction, and yet continue that transaction
for altruistic reasons. As one commentator wrote in 2011, “beyond a few tokens

interest rates will generally fall between 8 and 13%. Katie Murray, Financing Your Small Business With a
Microloan, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.sba.gov/blogs/financing-your-smallbusiness-microloan. Further, online small business loans from sites such as Kabbage.com can carry an average
annual percentage rate of 40%. See Darren Dahl, The Six-Minute Loan: How Kabbage Is Upending Small
Business Lending—And Building A Very Big Business, FORBES (May 25, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
darrendahl/2015/05/06/the-six-minute-loan-how-kabbage-is-upending-small-business-lending-and-building-avery-big-business/print/.
66
Indiegogo was chosen for this Comment for two reasons: it lists non-startups (as opposed to
Kickstarter), and has options for both standard and “all or nothing” campaigns.
67
Whether this projection satisfies creditors and the court will likely be a § 1129(a)(11) question. See
infra part III(F).
68
This is an ambitious, but not unreasonable, goal. For a discussion of crowdfunding success and failures,
see infra part III(F).
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of appreciation, [backers] get only the satisfaction of seeing an undertaking they
support come to life.”69
A real-life example may be illustrative of the rewards that Al’s can offer.
“Idiom Brewing Co.” offers a backer tier labeled “Carry a Part of Us With You!”
on its Indiegogo page.70 For $50, backers receive stickers and an “Idiom
Brewing Co. 64oz Growler.”71 Logical consumers would not pay $50 solely for
a growler and stickers; part of their bargained for exchange is also the knowledge
that their contribution has helped the company grow or stay in business. In Al’s
case, what Al’s chooses to offer backers is not particularly important so long as
it can make a large profit off of each transaction. Reward levels can range from
trivial to substantial. Idiom Brewing Co., for example, offers a $1000 reward
tier including, among other physical gifts, access to twice yearly “limited edition
release parties.”72 Presumably, Idiom spends little more than opportunity cost to
bring this reward to fruition. If Al’s can follow suit, it will make a considerable
profit.
Regardless of what the rewards actually are, some research suggests that
receiving them is often the driving factor in a backer’s decision to support a
campaign.73 Other backers are not paying for a trinket however, but for a chance
to feel good about themselves. As one paper acknowledged, “there is truth in the
claim that crowdfunding is based by and large on people’s altruism.”74 Some
commentators would term their transaction as one of “reciprocal altruism,” a
behavioral concept where a long-term investment is made without the promise
of immediate return.75 That said, just because the transaction is altruistic in
nature does not preclude some immediate benefit to the backer; he may have
paid $40 more for a growler then he would have at a store, but knowing that the
extra $40 may have helped keep his favorite brewery in business more than
makes up for the difference. It is up to project organizers to reward that altruism.

69

Cortese, supra note 4.
Idiom Brewing Co., INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/idiom-brewing-co#/ (last visited
Feb. 16, 2018).
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Cf. Paolo Crosetto and Tobias Renger, Crowdfunding: Determinants of success and funding
Dynamics, THE JENA ECON. RES. PAPERS (2014) (noting that “an enhanced presence of pre-selling rewards and
of rewards that confer social image to the pledger is positively correlated with project success”).
74
Paolo Crosetto, It’s Never Too Late for (Pre)-Sales: The Dynamics of Crowdfunding, PAOLO CROSETTO
(Jan. 22. 2015), https://paolocrosetto.wordpress.com/2015/01/22/its-never-too-late-the-dynamics-of-crowdfunding/.
75
For a discussion about how “reciprocal altruism” has played both a legal and an evolutionary role in
human development, see Scott Fruehwald, Reciprocal Altruism as the Basis for Contract, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REV. 489 (2009).
70
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As discussed in the next section, if backers receive nothing for their trouble, the
crowdfunding system will struggle to grow.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Law Should Promote Trust in Crowdfunding
Though backers are happy to pay for altruism, they require protection from
fraud and negligence. This section discusses why that is, what the law can do
about it, and why courts should care. Generally speaking, absent adequate and
visible protections, confidence in any system as a whole will wane. Creating an
avenue for backers to at least keep the “benefit” of their bargain—i.e., their
physical “reward perks”—can serve as a protection that stays within the limits
of the Code.76 Even if a campaign ultimately fails, providing debtors with
another avenue towards reorganization can only further the Code’s twin aims of
rehabilitation and creditor satisfaction, while at the same time adding a layer of
trust to the crowdfunding sector.
Trust is the key to any financial transaction.77 Rational consumers will only
part with their money if they know they are going to get a return on their
investment. As discussed infra in part II (C), though, the utility gained from that
investment need not be solely financial, and “rational behavior does not
necessarily always involve receiving the most monetary or material benefit
because the satisfaction received could be purely emotional.”78 Further, the
emotional appeal of participating in a crowdfunding campaign to save one’s

76
Crosetto, supra note 74. (noting that “project success seem[s] to have to do much more with sales than
with altruism”).
77
For the purposes of this article, “trust” can be defined in the lay sense of the word. Legal scholars have,
however, sought to qualify the concept further. For example, Timothy L. Fort & Liu Junhai write about three
types of “trust”—“hard,” “real,” and “good”—of which “real trust” is most applicable to crowdfunding (“The
idea underlying Real Trust is that customers, in particular, have reason to rely on the businesses that conduct
commerce over the Internet.”) Timothy L. Fort & Liu Junhai, Chinese Business and the Internet: The
Infrastructure for Trust, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1545, 1552 (2002); see also Michele Williams, In Whom
We Trust: Group Membership as an Affective Context for Trust Development, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 377, 378
(2001) (noting that a more formal way of defining trust is “one’s willingness to rely on another’s actions in a
situation involving the risk of opportunism”); Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1461 (2005)
(“[T]rust [is] the voluntary ceding of control over something valuable to another person or entity, based upon
one’s faith in the ability and willingness of that person or entity to care for the valuable thing.”).
78
See Rational Behavior, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rational-behavior.asp#
ixzz4W6s0w8XJ (last viewed Jan. 15, 2018).
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favorite family restaurant may also attract consumers that are acting
irrationally.79
At a micro level, without trust in a business, individual consumers will
choose to patronize a competitor, or to withhold their funds entirely. At the
macro level, such losses of confidence can have wide reaching consequences. In
the crowdfunding realm, if rational consumers as a whole lose faith in the
process, they will be less likely to participate. Ultimately, if crowdfunding can,
in users’ estimation, harm them in ways against which they cannot protect
themselves, users will be reluctant to embrace such technology—even if it is
otherwise beneficial.”80
More than just intuition supports this proposition. For example, Professors
Timothy L. Fort and Liu Junhai examined the issues of trust in another market
that was, at the time, not fully understood—E-commerce in China during the
early 2000’s.81 The two concluded that:
Over time, companies will learn that if they are to obtain repeat
customers, they will need to replicate the relationship-building
required to run a neighborhood shop. That is, they must keep
promises [and] provide quality performance. The market itself acts
as a disciplining mechanism to reach this kind of trust over a longer
haul, but law plays an important role as well.82
Further, they write, “In these situations, the rule of law . . . may be the most
effective guarantor of the integrity of an E-commerce transaction.”83
The rule of law can provide utility to the crowdfunding sector because it is
particularly susceptible to fraud and negligence.84 This is due in large part to two
factors. First, crowdfunding campaign managers often have little experience
beyond their specialized type of business.85 In Jones’ case, for example, decades
of experience running a pizzeria may be little help in the world of crowdfunding.
79
See Id. (“[B]ehavioral finance also analyzes irrational behavior on the part of the investor. This can
include making decisions based primarily on emotional components, such as investing in a company the investor
has positive feelings for even if financial models suggest the investment is not wise.”).
80
Justin Hurwitz, Trust and Online Interaction, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1579 (2013).
81
See generally Fort, supra note 75.
82
Id. at 1556.
83
Id. at 1560–61.
84
See generally Christopher Moores, Kickstart My Lawsuit: Fraud and Justice in Rewards-Based
Crowdfunding, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383 (2015).
85
Cf. Katherine Bindley, Failed Kickstarter Project Bankrupts Seth Quest, Hanfree iPad Stand Inventor:
Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/failed-kickstarterproject-seth-quest-hanfree-ipad_n_2479798.html (The project head noted that “Once the manufacturers knew
how much money he had to work with from [Kickstarter], they had the upper hand in negotiations.”).
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Second, the unpredictability of a crowdfunding campaign can cause bizarre and
unexpected issues to arise. For example, Flint & Tinder, a men’s underwear
company, saw production costs balloon after its Kickstarter campaign raised ten
times its goal, and the company found itself about 20,000 pairs of underwear
short of demand.86
Even campaigns that are initially successful are susceptible to massive
failure. For example, Hanfree, a hands-free stand for tablets, was fully funded
on Kickstarter for $35,000 before the project failed and its creator became
insolvent.87 Similarly, Rebus, a British “claims management firm” entered
administration, the UK’s equivalent of our bankruptcy system, despite raising
over £800,000 on the platform Crowdcube.88 While these examples of
negligence are somewhat well known, the prevalence of fraud has entered the
public eye largely due to several catastrophic crowdfunding failures. The hightech motorcycle helmet manufacturer Skully, for example, squandered $2.5
million in crowdfunds on, among other things, “apartment rent, grocery and
restaurant bills, two Dodge Vipers, a rented Lamborghini, $2,000 spent at a strip
club, and $2,345 worth of paintings.”89
Herein lays the problem for crowdfunding projects: until crowdfunding
portals break out of the realm of the early adopter, the public at large will view
them with skepticism. This is especially true considering that crowdfunding lies
in a sort of laissez-faire frontier with regards to regulation.90 Until it goes further
into the mainstream, the crowdfunding sector needs to maintain the trust and
support of its “early adopters”—those (relatively) few that have actually used
crowdfunding.91 Law, and bankruptcy law in particular, provides one avenue for
the protection of that trust.
Returning to our hypothetical, Al’s Pizza has $500,000 in debt and needs of
$25,000 for capital upgrades. The confirmation of Al’s plan relies on these
capital investments; without them, the restaurant is unlikely to meet the revenue
projections it needs to satisfy creditors. Al’s started a crowdfunding campaign
86
Alyson Shontell, How Raising $291,000 On Kickstarter Nearly Killed Underwear Startup Flint and
Tinder, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/flint-and-tinder-jake-bronsteinkickstarter-2012-12.
87
Bindley, supra note 75.
88
Adam Palin & Aime Williams, Rebus becomes largest crowdfunded failure, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016)
https://www.ft.com/content/804d41c2-ca6d-11e5-be0b-b7ece4e953a0.
89
David Z. Morris, Suit Alleges Rampant Fraud at Collapsed HUD Helmet Maker Skully, FORTUNE (Aug.
14, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/14/fraud-allegations-hud-skully/.
90
The JOBS Act was the first large scale attempt at federal oversight.
91
While one-fifth of Americans have participated in an online fundraising campaign of some sort, 61%
of Americans have never heard of the term “crowdfunding.” Smith, supra note 57.
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on Indiegogo.com with a goal of $25,000.92 As part of this goal, Al’s has created
several rewards for backers who contribute certain sums of money. Some of
these perks will be material, and those material perks will (ideally) be paid for
out of the crowdfunding proceeds.93 Some of those perks will be intangible, such
as future discounts, public recognition, or early access to new products. These
rewards may not be available until the end of the campaign. For example,
trinkets such as T-Shirts will likely be bought in bulk once Al’s can accurately
tell how many it needs. Further, some gifts, such as access to a grand-reopening,
may not be possible to provide until after the capital upgrades are complete.
Assume that Al’s begins its campaign successfully and raises $12,000 in the
first 15 days. Customer enthusiasm begins to wane, however, and $3,000 trickles
in over the next two weeks, leaving Al’s with one month to raise the remaining
$10,000. If he has chosen Indiegogo’s fixed funding plan, Jones must raise that
$10,000, or the platform will cancel all the previous contributions.94 This would,
of course, be very stressful for Jones on its own—but what if day 30 of the
campaign was also the day he filed for chapter 11?
B. Continuing the Crowdfund as an Executory Contract
Regardless of which funding plan Al’s chose, creditors are liable to question
whether entering bankruptcy should necessitate the cancelling of the campaign.
While many creditors may approve of the campaign, others, especially those
with liens subject to depreciation, may fear the added costs, risks, and
uncertainty that adding another moving piece to the reorganization may bring.
Creditors will also be wary of the possibility that rewards payments will shrink
the estate. As a result, creditors may ask whether the ongoing campaign should
be cancelled before the question of plan confirmation even arises. This section
will argue that a crowdfunding campaign can be an executory contract and,
therefore, can be analyzed (and continued) under § 365 of the Code.95

92
For simplicity, this Comment ignores the approximately 8% in fees (5% to Indiegogo, and between 35% to payment processors) that Al’s would lose from each pledge. See Fees & Pricing for Campaigners: How
Much Does Indiegogo Cost?, INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/204456408 (last
visited Feb. 16, 2018). Indiegogo, who may have $2400 at stake here, will pursue these funds as a traditional,
unsecured creditor.
93
For a discussion of the implications of post-petition financing and § 364, see infra at Part III (E).
94
“Fixed funding” refers to a payment plan wherein funds are only released to a campaign organizer if
the entire goal is met. On Indiegogo, both “fixed” and “flexible” funding, involve the same fees, and the only
significant differences involve what types of payments are accepted. Fees, supra note 92.
95
As it is not relevant, this Comment will not discuss assignment of executory contracts, which is
described in § 365(b) and (c).
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Section 365(a) holds that “the trustee [or debtor-in-possession], subject to
the court’s approval, may assume or reject any executory contract” of the
debtor.96 The contract itself remains subject to the automatic stay, though; nondebtors are required to perform their end of the contract until the debtor decides
to assume or reject it, but the contract’s terms are “temporarily unenforceable
against the debtor.”97 Should the debtor choose to continue to receive the
benefits of the contract, the Supreme Court has held that the non-debtor is
entitled to receive reasonable value for those goods or services “depending on
the circumstances of a particular contract.”98 Further, if the debtor assumes an
executory contract, “it must assume the entire contract cum onere—with all of
its burdens.”99
The first step of Al’s argument is to show that its crowdfunding campaign is
based upon a contract between Al’s and its backers. This should not be hard
because the transaction contains the traditional elements of a contract: the listing
on a crowdfunding portal is an offer, which consumers accept; the two parties
show a mutual assent, and have the capacity to do so; and the exchange of goods,
services, or cash creates consideration.100 The foundation of a contract is further
supported by legally operative101 language on IndieGoGo’s terms and conditions
page that states, “Campaign Owners are legally bound to perform on any
promise and/or commitment to Contributors (including delivering any

96

11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012).
In re Travelot Co., 286 B.R. 462, 466 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2002) (citing Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. N.H.
Elec. Coop., Inc., (In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.), 884 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir.1989)).
98
N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (1984) (“If the debtor-in-possession elects to
continue to receive benefits from the other party to an executory contract pending a decision to reject or assume
the contract, the debtor-in-possession is obligated to pay for the reasonable value of those services.”).
99
Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and Dot-Com Bankruptcies:
Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts Including Intellectual Property Agreements, and
Related Issues Under Section 365(c), and 365(e) and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 307, 310 (2000).
100
1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18 (3d ed. 1957).
101
The Uniform Commercial Code will generally support, and courts will generally uphold, a contract
formed by one’s acceptance of a website’s terms and conditions, which are known as “clickwraps” or
“browsewraps,” so long as the terms are not unconscionable. See Christopher Moores, Kickstart My Lawsuit:
Fraud and Justice in Rewards-Based Crowdfunding, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383, 396 (2015). Courts have found
a contract both where the user was aware that they were entering a contract and where the site put a reasonably
prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract. Compare Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d
393, 402 (2nd. Cir. 2004) (finding likelihood of success on the merits in a breach of browsewrap claim where
the defendant “admitted that it was fully aware of the terms” of the offer) with Van Tassell v. United Mktg., 795
F.Supp.2d 770, 792–93 (E.D. Il. 2011) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause in browsewrap agreement that was
only noticeable after a “multi-step process” of clicking through non-obvious links); see generally Nguyen v.
Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Indeed, courts have consistently enforced
browsewrap agreements where the user had actual notice of the agreement”).
97
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perks).”102 If a contract exists, then, Al’s can use one of two theories, generally
speaking, to show that it is executory.
Courts have promulgated two basic ways to determine the “executoriness”
of contracts.103 Executory contracts are not defined in § 365, and, in drafting the
Code, Congress itself chose not to define such contracts.104 Section 365 does,
however, allow for a trustee to rely on applicable state laws to assume or reject
an executory contract.105 Professor Vern Countryman provided the earliest
understanding of executory contracts in bankruptcy in 1973.106 Under the
Countryman “material breach” test, an executory contract is one “under which
the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far
unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute
a material breach excusing the performance of the other.”107 Thus, “[o]nly a
contract that satisfied this test could be assumed by the estate.”108 The Third,
Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted this view.109
On the other hand, as the Fifth Circuit wrote, courts following the
Countryman test “have worked needless and perhaps unconstitutional forfeitures
of security interests.”110 As a result, many bankruptcy judges have abandoned
the Countryman test in favor of more holistic approaches.111 However, these

102

Terms of Use, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/about/terms (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
The progenitor case of executory contract theory in bankruptcy is Copeland v. Stephens, 106 E.R. 218
(1818). In Copeland, “the King’s Bench held that a debtor’s obligations remaining under a lease could not be
delegated in bankruptcy unless they were affirmatively assumed by the trustee.” In 1892, the United States
Supreme Court adopted a similar view in Quincy v. Humphreys, where Chief Justice Fuller wrote that, with
regards to assignees, . . . the law casts upon such assignee the legal title to the unexpired term of the lease, and
he thus becomes assignee of the term by operation of law, unless, from prudential considerations, he elects to
reject the term as being without benefit to the creditors. Quincy, Mo. & Pac. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 82,
97 (1892).
104
S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 58 (noting that “though there is no precise definition of what contracts are
executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides.”).
105
11 U.S.C. § 365(C)(1)(a) (2012). This Comment will assume no interference from state laws.
106
Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439 (1973).
107
Id. at 460.
108
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 236
(1989).
109
Cf. In re Kiwi Int’l Air Lines, Inc., 344 F.3d 311, 317–18 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989)); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Newcomb,
744 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Select-a-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980).
110
In re Austin Dev. Co., 19 F.3d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1994).
111
See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection,” 59 U. COLO.
L. REV. 845, 850 (1988) (arguing that the “principal effect” of Countryman’s definition “has been to produce
substantial unnecessary confusion.”); Olin McGill & Hon. Francis G. Conrad, Exorcising Executoriness:
Functionalist Arguments and Incantations to Avoid Meeting the Devil in the Woods, NORTON ANN. SURV.
103
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tests have also been met with scholarly criticism. Professor Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, for example, derided the consideration of executory contracts as
property of the estate in 1989:
This view treats such contracts just like the two left shoes the trustee
finds in the office cloakroom, to be sold if possible or abandoned if
without value. This analysis will not do, however, because the trustee
cannot merely sell or abandon a contract; the estate must pay for the
rights it confers or pay damages for abandoning it, burdens that do not
attach to the shoes.112

The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as many District and Bankruptcy courts
(including the Southern District of New York) have adopted the functional
approach “under which a contract is executory when the estate would benefit
from the assumption or rejection of the contract.”113 In In re Jolly, for example,
the Sixth Circuit wrote that the “strong Congressional policy of rehabilitating a
debtor as effectively as possible by letting in the largest possible number of
creditors” rendered the Countryman standard too rigid for many cases.114
Contracts that courts have deemed executory under the functional approach
are varied. A good example is In re Becknell, where the Sixth Circuit held that
a lease-purchase agreement, which gave the purchaser a fee-simple interest in
three million tons of coal, was executory because both creditor and debtor “had
obligations to perform in the future.”115 The Sixth Circuit used similar reasoning
in In re Jolly to disallow a debtor’s rejection because the contract was not “an
obligation for the debtor to do something in the future.”116
Whether the Countryman definition would provide favorable results for Al’s
is unclear. If Al’s can persuade the court that failing to go forward with the
crowdfund would give rise to a material breach claim by its backers, it may
BANKR. L. 137, 144 (1994) (stating that functional approach emerged slowly due to frustration over
Countryman’s test).
112
Westbrook, supra note 108, at 245.
113
Michelle Morgan Harner, Carl E. Black & Eric R. Goodman, Debtors Beware: The Expanding
Universe of Non-Assumable/non-Assignable Contracts in Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 187, 191
(2005); see In re Jolly, 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1978) (“Generally, they are agreements which include an
obligation for the debtor to do something in the future)”; In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc., 138 B.R.
687, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The concept of the ‘executory contract’ in bankruptcy should be defined in
light of the purpose for which the trustee is given the option to assume or reject.”).
114
In re Jolly, 574 F.2d at 351; see also Westbrook, supra note 108, at 229–30 (arguing that the
Countryman definition is too rigid in all cases and should be abandoned).
115
In re Becknell & Crace Coal Co., Inc., 761 F.2d 319, 322 (6th Cir. 1985).
116
In re Jolly, 574 F.2d at 351 (“In this case there is no obligation for the debtor to do anything in the
future. His duty was in the past, he has breached that duty, and had judgment entered against him for that
breach.”).
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persuade a court using this standard. However, creditors may have a viable
argument that the backers’ contributions are so small and diffuse that bringing
those claims would be both meaningless and impossible.
It is likely that crowdfunding debtors would prefer the functional approach
because it casts a wider net than the Countryman definition.117 If Al’s used a
fixed funding campaign, it will argue that, like the debtor in In re Becknell, both
it and its creditors (the backers) have obligations to perform in the future—Al’s
must provide the promised perks, and the backers must pay the promised
pledges.118 Finally, because Al’s can benefit from a flexible funding campaign
even if it were ceased halfway through (i.e., through the already received funds),
such campaigns can also fall under the functional approach. This is true even if
rewards are still due to backers because, as the Eleventh Circuit wrote, “Even
though there may be material obligations outstanding on the part of only one of
the parties to the contract, it may nevertheless be deemed executory under the
functional approach.”119
1. Assuming the Contract
It is likely that Al’s will want to continue to crowdfund for three main
reasons. First, even if the campaign is struggling, it represents the restaurant’s
best option for gaining new capital. Second, depending on how far along the
campaign is, Al’s may have invested funds in rewards, and its only way to
recoup those expenditures will likely be through completing the campaign.
Finally, Al’s will want to avoid disappointing its backers, especially if they are
its literal last chance at a successful reorganization. Al’s will therefore most
likely wish to assume the contract.
If the crowdfunding contract is executory, a debtor-in-possession has the
power to decide whether to assume it or to reject it, subject to court approval.120
Especially with regard to assumption, though, approval is not guaranteed, as it
“produce[s] a discontinuity with the normal rules for treatment of creditors
[because] the estate itself becomes obligated on the contract, and the non-debtor
117
Executory contracts are property of the estate under § 541. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp.,
Inc., 138 B.R. at 702.
118
In a fixed funding campaign, backers are generally not charged until the campaign’s goal has been met.
119
See In re Gen. Dev. Corp., 84 F.3d 1364, 1374 (11th Cir. 1996).
120
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012). Professor Andrew argues that “rejection” is a misnomer and should be seen
more as “non-assumption,” which changes the legal framework surrounding the court approval process
significantly. Andrew, supra note 111, at 849–50. He writes that “Understanding that rejection does not affect
contract liabilities demonstrates, for example, that litigation over whether rejection will be permitted is largely
a pointless exercise.” Id. at 890.
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party departs the ranks of ordinary creditors and becomes a priority claimant.”121
Courts will generally analyze the debtor’s decision under the “business
judgment” standard, which was favored by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Bildisco.122
The business judgment standard asks whether the decision to assume “is not
materially different from any other investment decision made by a trustee,” and
the court will ask “[w]hat use or disposition of the assets of the estate is best
calculated to maximize the return to creditors.”123 Or, put differently, the test
“requires only that the trustee demonstrate that rejection [or acceptance] of the
executory contract will benefit the estate.”124 As courts are generally hesitant to
overrule the trustee or debtor-in-possession with regards to business matters,
then, the choice to assume or reject the contract is usually respected. Al’s
creditors would therefore have to argue that Al’s choice to assume is the
incorrect one. If they fail to do so, Al’s choice will stand. The creditors’
argument may hinge on risk, depreciation, or allegations of bad faith, but, as
with the question of feasibility, discussed further in part III (F), Al’s would likely
succeed.
2. Rejecting the Contract
Depending on the circumstances, Al’s may wish to reject the executory
contract if it believes it will benefit the estate. As mentioned above, courts
generally use the business judgment standard when evaluating the decision to
reject an executory contract.125 If the contract is rejected, Al’s will not face
liability for breach, meaning that backers, like so many other unsecured
creditors, receive nothing.
Rejection can raise a question that challenges the laissez-faire nature of
crowdfunding regulation: what happens when a business simply chooses to
renege on its plan to raise equity through loyal customers? On its face, it would
seem odd to force a party to do something it is not contractually obligated to

121

Id.
N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984); see Andrew, supra note 111, at 895.
123
Andrew, supra note 111, at 895–96.
124
In re Stable Mews Assocs., Inc., 41 B.R. 594, 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). It should be noted that the
S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court, as well as the D.C. Circuit, overruled parts of In re Stable Mews Assocs. with
regards to a debtor’s decision to reject a contract when that rejection ran afoul of federal rent control guidelines.
see In re Friarton Estates Corp. 65 B.R. 586, 590 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1986); Saravia v. 1736 18th Street, N.W.,
Ltd. P’ship 844 F.2d 823, 826 (D.C. Cir 1988).
125
See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526.
122
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do.126 The party most obviously opposed to rejection of the contract is the
backers. IndieGoGo, the crowdfunding platform, may also object on the basis
that fees owed to it will be nullified by rejection. The analysis is also likely to
be complicated here by creditors: if Al’s leaves funds on the table, creditors will
lose out on a chance to see those funds turned into new capital and that capital
turned into a higher rate of repayment. Even in a worst-case scenario, those
already liquid assets can simply be added into the estate and distributed in
chapter 7. The presence of these three interests compels a more careful
consideration by the courts.127 To resolve the dispute, courts can again use the
business judgment standard to evaluate crowdfunding obligations.
As described above, bankruptcy courts “routinely defer to the business
judgment of [a] chapter 11 debtor-in-possession with respect to decisions
involving the management of the debtor’s property and the operation of the
debtor’s business.”128 Courts may decline this deference, though, especially in
the bankruptcy context, as “the directors of the chapter 11 debtor, however, are
not empowered with carte blanche authority to run the company. The business
judgment rule simply provides a presumption of propriety that ultimately may
be refuted.”129
Describing all the scenarios that could overcome such a presumption would
likely go beyond the scope of this Comment. This is largely because, in the
words of one commentator, “thousands of pages of corporate law scholarship
and commentary have been devoted to these fundamental questions, yet we
remain short of any broad consensus as to the answers.”130
As this Comment is debtor-friendly, it is tempting to simply defer to both
the debtor’s wishes and the law’s reluctance to force people into contracts.131
126
See Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 281 (7th Cir.1996) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring) (“Freedom not to contract should be protected as stringently as freedom to contract.”).
127
Adding a layer of scrutiny onto the business judgment rule is not unheard of; the Supreme Court did
just that with regards to labor contracts in Bildisco. N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526.
128
Ann Marie Bredin & Mark G. Douglas, Bankruptcy Filing to Prevent Asset Sale Constitutes Bad Faith,
2 BUS. RESTRUCTURING R. 10, 10 (2003).
129
Id.
130
Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 573 (2000);
accord Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t A Rule — The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV.
631, 631 (2002) (“The much misunderstood business judgment rule is not a “rule” at all.”). For a critique of the
business judgment rule as favoring authority over accountability, as well as a proposed “new business judgment
rule,” see D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule, B.Y.U.L. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 1509 (Jun. 19, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2620536.
131
Todd D. Rakoff, Is “Freedom from Contract” Necessarily A Libertarian Freedom? 2004 WIS. L. REV.
477, 477 (2004) (“Freedom from contract is a part of the human freedom the law wants to protect as it structures
and maintains the institution of contract.”) (emphasis added).
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That position would unfortunately run counter to a central position of this
Comment; namely, that the law should foster trust in the crowdfunding sector.
If courts allow crowdfunding debtors to avoid all liability for cancelling their
campaigns without seriously evaluating the rejection decision, backers will lose
confidence in the system and turn their wallets elsewhere. A court should take a
serious look at any decision to reject. Even if the decision is sound, the court
should do everything in its power to steer at least some benefit back to the
backers, even if that benefit needs to be realized via § 105. As described
previously in part III (A), not doing so could have serious repercussions for the
crowdfunding sector as a whole.
3. Default before Bankruptcy
Regarding the campaign, if § 365 is invoked, § 365’s default provision may
be difficult for Al’s to overcome because, even under ideal circumstances, Al’s
prospects for curing, compensating or providing adequate protection are largely
speculative. However, as discussed below, courts can allow Al’s to satisfy
§ 365(b) in creative or flexible ways.
A small business may have defaulted in some way on the crowdfunding
campaign before filing for chapter 11. It may have overestimated the public’s
willingness and ability to support it, for example, and therefore not been able to
follow through on some part of its reward scheme.132 Section 365 requires
debtors to cure defaults in executory contracts, or to provide adequate assurance
of a prompt cure, before assuming them.133 Congress’s intent in imposing these
conditions, the Second Circuit found, was “to insure that the contracting parties
receive the full benefit of their bargain if they are forced to continue
performance.”134
It makes sense then for a court to simply reject any attempt by the debtor to
assume a crowdfunding contract that it has, or will, default upon. This will be
easy if those funds have not yet been collected from backers. However, if at least

132
Considering the often-token nature of crowdfunding rewards, a business in this boat likely has bigger
concerns than having its chapter 11 plan confirmed.
133
11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(a) (2012).
134
In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 85 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir. 1996); accord In re Superior Toy &
Manufacturing Co., 78 F.3d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir.1996) (“‘If the trustee is to assume a contract or lease, the court
will have to insure that the trustee’s performance under the contract or lease gives the other contracting party the
full benefit of his bargain.”).
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some of the funds made it into the hands of the debtor, creditors are likely to
seek their inclusion in the estate as a means of solidifying their own claims.135
Courts should not consider the question of a defaulted upon executory
contract inflexibly. As the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York described in In re Evelyn Brynes, Inc., “the legislative history of the Code
shows that [the terms ‘adequate assurance’] were intended to be given a
practical, pragmatic construction.”136 Although In re Evelyn Brynes concerned
§ 365’s treatment of the assignment of leases, its flexible interpretation can
apply just as well to executory contracts:
Congress did not mandate that the courts require the assignee to
literally comply with each and every term of the lease. It has
entrusted to the courts the determination, on a case-by-case basis,
of the meaning of the term “adequate assurance,” taking into
account whether the [debtor’s] opposition to the assignment is
“based upon reason and [is] not arbitrary or capricious.”137
In re Evelyn Brynes suggests that a small business can provide adequate
assurance in any number of ways. Courts should evaluate adequate assurance
based on the particular circumstances of each case. If Al’s defaulted on its
crowdfunding obligations because the crowdfund was unsuccessful, there may
be no way in which adequate assurance can be guaranteed. Conversely,
supposing that Al’s was unable to purchase and distribute rewards because funds
from the campaign went straight to other creditors, a court may reckon that, with
the automatic stay in place, Al’s can use post-petition crowdfunds to promptly
cure any defaults.
One could also suppose that Al’s might attempt to cure the default in the
crowdfund by promising the rewards to be given after its grand re-opening—an
undetermined date well after the confirmation of his chapter 11 plan. In this
scenario, courts are going to need to choose between the two sets of claimants—
the backers and the creditors. This choice may boil down to a simple fact
determination considering the surrounding circumstances of the campaign, and
a sympathetic court may accept Al’s plans. That said, it may be more prudent to
simply include these funds in the estate, and hope that backers will gain some

135
In this instance, and as described further in part II (C) creditors would argue that any monies collected
from the (pre-petition) crowdfund are property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1) (2012). If these funds
are property of the estate, and the executory contract is in default, it is in the creditor’s best interest to ensure
that the crowdfunds remain property of the estate.
136
In re Evelyn Byrnes, Inc., 32 B.R. 825, 828–29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
137
Id. at 829 (citations omitted).
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altruistic benefit from knowing that their contribution at least gave their (now
liquidated) favorite business some breathing room in chapter 7.
C. Crowdfunds as a Contingent Interest
The concept of contingent interests provides Al’s with another avenue to
keep its campaign running if § 365 fails. In the case of all or nothing, rewardsbased campaigns, a project organizer may have a contingent interest in the funds
he would raise should the campaign continue.138 If those funds are contingent,
they become property of the estate. As described above with regards to § 365,
the concept of contingent interests creates a double-edged sword for Al’s: if the
funds are a part of the estate, creditors will be able to eventually reach them.
However, if creditors know that they will receive at least some benefit from the
crowdfund should Al’s enter chapter 7, they will have less incentive to object to
the campaign’s continuation. This breathing room can give Al’s both time and
space to complete the crowdfund and, ideally, to use the received funds to
successfully reorganize. It is therefore in the interests of both Al’s and its
creditors for the proceeds of the crowdfund to be classified as contingent.
Although no courts have addressed whether withheld crowdfunds qualify as
a contingent interest, § 541(a) is broad enough to include them. Most courts
interpret § 541(a) broadly, and property of the estate has been stretched to
include “speculative” interests. As the Second Circuit ruled, “[E]very
conceivable interest of the debtor, future, nonpossessory, contingent,
speculative, and derivative, is within the reach of § 541.”139 Among other
prospective causes, courts have held that potential claims asserted against
insurance companies140 and the right to receive per capita distribution of
earnings from a tribe’s gaming activity by a member of that tribe in the event
that it chose to distribute those funds141 are contingent interests.142 Also
illustrative are the cases wherein courts have held that such contingent interests
are property of the estate even if some post-petition action must be taken in order

138
See Contingent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Possible; uncertain; unpredictable;
Dependent on something that might or might not happen in the future; conditional.”).
139
Chartschlaa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2008).
140
Id. at 123.
141
In re Kedrowski, 284 B.R. 439, 449 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2002) (finding the prospective distribution a
“property right”).
142
See also In re Goins, 181 B.R. 45, 47 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (future wages); In re Carlton, 309 B.R.
67, 75 (Bankr. S. D. Fla. 2004) (stock options); In re Moyer, 421 B.R. 587, 590–91 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007)
(increase in value of stock of wholly-owned corporation); In re Anders, 151 B.R. 543, 547 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1993) (post-petition spousal payments).
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for the interests to be realized.143 Further, the Supreme Court added an element
of temporality to the analysis in Segal v. Rochelle by holding that a payment was
contingent because it was “sufficiently rooted in the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy
past.”144 As a dissent in a Tenth Circuit case decades later noted, however,
finding a line between “contingencies” and “mere expectancies” is still crucial
for courts.145
If the court accepts that Al’s campaign, which was conceived, begun, and
operating before it filed for bankruptcy, is sufficiently rooted in the pre-petition
period, then, it must determine whether the realization of those funds is indeed
contingent. It can do so by looking at both the crowdfunding market in general
and the facts specific to Al’s case. The court’s determination of the contingent
issue will be complicated somewhat by one of the peculiarities of crowdfunding.
IndieGoGo claims that campaigns raise, on average, 42% of their total during
the first three and last three days of their duration.146 This fact can play into a
debtor’s favor; even if Al’s is behind its projected earnings, it can honestly
suggest that contributions are more likely to increase as the campaign nears its
deadline.
A more comprehensive look at the crowdfunding landscape is provided by
Wharton School of Business Professor Ethan Mollick. Mollick, at the request of
Kickstarter, developed an independent study of “nearly 500,000” backers with
which the platform had interacted.147 Mollick found that, among other things,
“[p]roject backers should expect a failure rate of around 1-in-10 projects, and to
receive a refund 13% of the time . . . . Ultimately, there does not seem to be a
systematic problem associated with failure (or fraud) on Kickstarter, and the vast
majority of projects do seem to deliver.”148 However, because Kickstarter is a
vastly different platform from IndieGoGo, as it deals almost exclusively in
“products” and not in services (unlike IndieGoGo, which supports both),
143
See In re Mid-Island Hosp., Inc., 276 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2002) (hospital’s “speculative” and
“intangible” interest in funds withheld contingent on the satisfaction of its obligations to the State was property
of the estate).
144
Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966); see also In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir.
2010) (“Like stock options, the fact that the [interests] are contingent on post-petition events does not mean that
Debtors’ interest in them is not rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past.”).
145
In re Dittmar, 618 F.3d at 1213 (Holloway, J., dissenting); see also In re Klein-Swanson, 488 B.R.
628, 633 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013) (finding that bonus payments due after filing are not property of the estate
because the employer had “absolute discretion” whether to award them).
146
Amy Yeh, New Research Study: 7 Stats from 100,000 Crowdfunding Campaigns, INDIEGOGO (Oct. 6,
2015), https://go.indiegogo.com/blog/2015/10/crowdfunding-statistics-trends-infographic.html.
147
The Kickstarter Fulfillment Report, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/fulfillment (last
visited Feb. 3, 2018).
148
Id.
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Mollick’s findings do not apply perfectly to Al’s situation. Indeed, a report by
London-based market research firm The Crowdfunding Centre found that, in
2015, only 13% of IndieGoGo campaigns ended fully funded.149
It should be noted that these numbers are likely skewed by projects that are
doomed from the start. For example, on November 5, 2016, the author found a
campaign titled “Help Jump Start My Business! Chance to Win $2,000!” The
campaign was organized by a would-be stock guru attempting to raise $10,000
to start his career as a trader. The project organizer’s sole reward category was
an entry to win $2,000. On March 5, 2017, the campaign had raised $0.150 For
comparison, in a campaign called “Modern Milk: A unique mom & baby
wellness center,” a small business raised 103% of its $25,000 goal.151 Keeping
this in mind, a sympathetic judge may be justified in doubting The
Crowdfunding Centre’s 13% figure, at least as applied to the case in front of her.
In Al’s case, a simpler solution would be to ask the court to make a judgment
call as to whether it believes Al’s campaign will reach its goal and receive its
funds. Courts can consider several factors for this test. As suggested previously
in part II (C), Al’s could argue that its loyal and widespread swath of customers
is more likely than not to help it fully fund the campaign. Of course, the
discouraging crowdfunding statistics described above will have less effect on
the judge if the campaign is on track to hit or exceed its goal. Proving this by
sticking to the particular facts of its case should allow Al’s to convince a court
that, like so many other varied interests, its potential crowdfunding earnings are
contingent.
D. Operating the Crowdfund Using Estate Property via § 363
If the crowdfund can proceed and the crowdfunds do enter into the estate,
some creditors may look to object to specific parts of its mechanics. Most
prominent of those mechanics is the fact that estate property will be used, in
some ways, to both operate the crowdfund and to bring rewards to fruition.
Arguably, § 363 permits the court to allow such use of estate property.

149
Catherine Clifford, Less than a Third of Crowdfunding Campaigns Reach Their Goals, ENTREPRENEUR
(Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/269663.
150
See Daniel McGuire, Help Jump Start My Business! Chance to Win $2,000!, INDIEGOGO,
https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/help-jump-start-my-business-chance-to-win-2-000-entrepreneur#/
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2018).
151
See Stephanie Nguyen, Modern Milk: A Unique Mom & Baby Wellness Center, INDIEGOGO,
https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/modern-milk-a-unique-mom-baby-wellness-center-lifestylehealth/x/15370259#/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
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The Code acknowledges that business owners are usually the ones most
likely to successfully manage their reorganizations.152 Specifically, §§ 1107 and
1108 allow the debtor-in-possession to act as trustee and continue to run the
business. Thus, the Code allows business owners the latitude to run their
reorganizing businesses as they see fit, with few limitations. Two of those
notable limitations are found in §§ 363 and 364.
Section 363 concerns the use, sale, or lease of property of the estate by the
trustee or debtor-in-possession.153 In the crowdfunding arena, § 363 is likely to
arise in the context of “use” of the property by the debtor to fulfill its reward
obligations.154 For example, creditors will object (rationally or otherwise) to
Al’s spending money on providing T-shirts and tasting parties to backers when
it owes them money, especially if property securing that money (e.g., the pizza
oven) is depreciating in value.155 Creditors may also use § 363 to object to the
“use” of cash collateral. For example, Al’s suppliers will likely seek to stop any
cash collateral that they have an interest in from being used in the crowdfunding
campaign.156 Conversely, though, Al’s may see these “uses” as his best way of
escaping his debt predicament, despite what his creditors may think.
Section 363 tries to strike a balance between debtor autonomy and creditor
oversight by relying on the “ordinary course of business” standard to evaluate
debtor decisions regarding use of property of the estate. Section 363(c) states
that a trustee “may enter into transactions, including the sale or lease of property
of the estate, in the ordinary course of business, without notice or a hearing, and
may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business without notice
or a hearing.”157 This means that Al’s is free to use its property to crowdfund
without court approval, so long as the crowdfund is within the ordinary course
of business. If its creditors wish to stop the crowdfund, then, they must (a) show
that it is not within the ordinary course of business, therefore triggering a

152
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 612, 615–16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“Indeed, the Code favors
the continued operation of a business by a debtor and a presumption of reasonableness attaches to a debtor’s
management decisions”). Allowing a debtor-in-possession to continue to manage his business also protects the
objectivity of the involved judge. The House Judiciary Committee admitted as much, writing that “it is an easy
matter for a bankruptcy judge to feel personally responsible for the success or failure of a case. Bankruptcy
judges frequently view a case as ‘my case’. The institutional bias thus generated magnifies the likelihood of
unfair decisions in the bankruptcy court. H.R. REP. 95-595 at 91, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6052.
153
11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012).
154
“Use” is interpreted broadly. See In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc., 780 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1986)
(“application of funds derived from airline operations” to satisfy lease obligations constituted use).
155
This analysis assumes that secured creditors will not raise adequate protection claims under § 363(e).
156
11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2012).
157
Id. § 363(c)(1).
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hearing, and (b) convince the court to refuse authorization of the campaign under
§ 363(c)(1).
1. Ordinary Course of Business
Al’s campaign will be evaluated for § 363 purposes under the ordinary
course of business standard. The ordinary course of business standard is intended
to protect ordinary trade transactions between a debtor and a creditor.158 To fall
within the ordinary course of business, an action taken by the debtor-inpossession must satisfy a two-pronged test. The “vertical” prong requires that
the debtor’s action be reasonably anticipated by all parties in interest given the
range and scope of the business. The “horizontal” prong asks whether similarly
situated businesses would have engaged in such conduct. As the Eighth Circuit
wrote in Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking, “[T]here is no precise legal test which
can be applied” to determine what transactions occur in the ordinary course of
business, “rather, th[e] court must engage in a ‘peculiarly factual’ analysis.”159
Like the business judgment rule, this standard is flexible. As the Southern
District of New York ruled in In re Johns-Manville Corp., the ordinary course
of business standard is “purposely not defined so narrowly as to deprive a debtor
of the flexibility it needs to run its business and respond quickly to changes in
the business climate.”160 As a result, “[t]he § 363 mandate necessarily includes
the concomitant discretion to exercise reasonable judgment in ordinary business
matters.”161
Satisfying the vertical prong of the test will be the more difficult burden for
Al’s to overcome. As the Southern District of New York held in In re James
Phillips, Inc., “The touchstone of ‘ordinariness’ is thus the interested parties’
reasonable expectations of what transactions the debtor in possession is likely to
enter in the course of its business.”162 In other words, the test asks “whether the
transaction subjects a creditor to economic risks of a nature different from those
158
John Kane, Litigating the Ordinary Course of Business Defense Summary Judgment and the Stanziale
v. Industrial Specialists Decision, INSOLVENCY INSIGHTS (Sep. 30, 2015), https://insolvencyinsights.
com/2015/09/30/litigating-the-ordinary-course-of-business-defense-summary-judgment-and-the-stanziale-vindustrial-specialists-decision/.
159
Lovett v. St. Johnsbury Trucking, 931 F.2d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1991). Note that the ordinary course of
business standard used in §§ 363 and 364 is the same as, and is arguably derived from, that used in § 547. See
In re Poff Const., Inc., 141 B.R. 104, 105 (W.D. Va. 1991) (“Not finding a definition of that phrase within the
Bankruptcy Code, the lower court turned to cases from other jurisdictions interpreting ‘ordinary course of
business’ in the context of § 547 dealing with preferences.”).
160
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 612, 617 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
161
Id. at 616.
162
In re James A. Phillips, Inc., 29 B.R. 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
60 B.R. at 616.
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he accepted when he decided to extend credit.”163 Considering the fact intensive
nature of the risks that the campaign will impose on creditors, a court’s view on
whether the vertical relationship in Al’s case is hard to predict. For example, in
In re Roth American, Inc. the Third Circuit found that the specific facts of a
collective bargaining agreement were “extraordinary” enough to push said
agreement outside the normal course of business, despite the fact that such
agreements “routinely” satisfied the horizontal prong.164
Similarly, Al’s creditors may argue that it never expected a pizza shop to get
involved with online fundraising, and that even if it did, the type of fundraising
Al’s is engaged in is on a scale significantly beyond what they had expected.
While there are no guarantees, Al’s will likely be able to reply that continuing
the crowdfund adds no significant risk besides depreciation and opportunity
cost, especially if the campaign is well designed. Al’s could ease creditor’s
minds, for example, by ensuring that rewards are paid for exclusively by income
from the campaign. Further, if the campaign is only scheduled for a few months,
these risks will be minimal.
A crowdfunding business should pass the horizontal test relatively simply.
To satisfy this test, Al’s must show that the crowdfund “conformed to standard
practices in the [pizzeria] industry as a whole.”165 At best, Al’s would be able to
show that crowdfunding is a new normal in the small business sphere, as
discussed supra in part II (B). At worst, Al’s should be able to compare
crowdfunding favorably with other types of promotional campaigns in which
pizzerias normally partake.166 A close comparison might be a fundraising night,
where Al’s agrees to donate a token percentage of its receipts for one evening to
a local school or organization. Like the crowdfund, the fundraiser sacrifices
liquid capital in exchange for long term gains, although in the case of the latter,
these gains take the form of both community goodwill and the potential for
163

In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. at 616.
In re Roth American, Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 953 (3d Cir. Pa. 1992) (noting that the “agreement is
fundamentally different from the previous collective bargaining agreements entered into between Roth American
and the Teamsters insofar as it contains the provision purporting to bind Roth American to maintain its
operations”).
165
Courts have wide discretion to decide this inquiry. See In re Blitz U.S.A. Inc., 475 B.R. 209, 214
(Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (continuation of an incentive-based bonus plan was a common industry practice, and
satisfied the horizontal prong); In re Glosser Bros., Inc., 124 B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (holding
that it was common industry practice for department store like debtor to license others to operate certain
departments, and for store to terminate license when it was dissatisfied with performance of licensee.”)
166
Promotional actions can satisfy the horizontal prong. Cf. In re Atlanta Retail, Inc. 287 B.R. 849, 857
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002) (“For a calculated financial exposure, [debtor] gained immeasurable promotional
exposure. Examined in this context, it is hard for this Court to imagine a similarly situated financially distressed
debtor, attempting to restructure, that would not enter into such a promotion.”).
164
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increased business. Again, because the risks to creditors are relatively low in this
situation, and given the wide authority debtors-in-possession are allowed by
§§ 1107 and 1108, courts should at least consider the feasibility of the
crowdfund before rejecting it outright at this stage.167
2. Cash Collateral
In a similar fashion, creditors can attack the use of cash collateral through
§ 363(c)(2), which holds that trustees cannot use, sell, or lease cash collateral
without consent of entities with an interest (i.e., creditors) or court authorization
after a hearing. Because of the adequate protection requirement of § 363(e), the
cash collateral concept is likely a creditor’s best option for reigning in Al’s
crowdfund.
Al’s already-received crowdfunds may be cash collateral. Section 363(a)
defines cash collateral as “cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title,
securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in
which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest . . . .”168
Section 363 also holds that the “proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits
of property” subject to a lien are cash collateral.169 Section 552(b)(1) continues
the creditor’s security interest in the proceeds of the inventory collateral.170 If
funds raised as part of the campaign can be traced as “proceeds, products, or
offspring” to property encumbered by a future acquired property clause, they
will be considered cash collateral.171
The cash collateral issue is most likely to be raised by Al’s suppliers. If the
supplier succeeds in showing that Al’s is using cash collateral in which it has an
interest, absent consent, Al’s must get court authorization to do so “in
accordance with the provisions” of § 363(c)(2)(B).172 Courts generally see this
edict as a reference to § 363(e), which requires a debtor to provide adequate
protection in exchange for the use of cash collateral.173 In a contested hearing,
167
168
169
170

Feasibility is discussed in detail infra at Part III (F).
11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (2012).
Id.
William L. Norton Jr., § 94:6. Cash collateral (Code § 363), NORTON BANKRUPTCY L. PRACTICE (Jan.

2018).
171
Id. (“[I]f the debtor has granted a prepetition security interest in particular assets to a lender or other
creditor, the proceeds of that prepetition collateral that fall within the definition of cash collateral will also be
cash collateral.”)
172
11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(B) (2012).
173
In re George Ruggiere Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 727 F.2d 1017, 1019, (11th Cir. 1984) (“[t]he principal
restraint on use of cash proceeds is found in § 363(e), which specifies that the court shall condition the use of
the secured property ‘as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest’”).
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the pre-petition lender has the burden to prove the “validity, priority or extent”
of its interest in cash collateral.174
The objected “use” of cash collateral in this situation can take several forms.
Suppose that Al’s purchases $1000 of cheese from a supplier on credit. Al’s then
uses the cheese to earn $1500 in sales. § 552(b)(1) allows the supplier to claim
an interest in that income as “proceeds, products, or offspring” of the original
credit.175 If Al’s spends that money on shirts or fees for a crowdfunding
campaign, the supplier will naturally be worried about its investment. Unless
Al’s suppliers consent to the use of the cash collateral in which they have an
interest, Al’s will need to provide the supplier with adequate protection in one
of the ways prescribed by § 361. For a small business, such as Al’s, consent is a
possibility, especially if it is dealing with another small business. For example,
if Al’s receives its dairy products from a local farm, the farm’s owners may
reason that spoiling its relationship with a local customer is a sub-optimal
solution. For larger suppliers, such as condiment wholesalers, retaining a full
interest will likely outweigh any loyalty to one of many customers. With that in
mind, Al’s would do well to make sure that it can adequately protect that interest
before it considers fighting for its campaign proceeds. If adequate protection
creates a severe burden on Al’s, it may endanger the campaign.
E. Paying for Rewards through § 364
This section suggests that § 364, which concerns the steps debtors-inpossession must take to obtain credit, is the avenue by which crowdfunding
debtors can fulfill their obligations to backers. Debtors may argue that, because
the “debt” accrued through the campaign (i.e., the obligations to backers) is
going to be paid for, essentially, by those consumers, § 364 is a dead end. Put
more simply, the rewards a backer expects are being paid for by her contribution.
Creditors are of course not likely to accept this argument. Instead, they will
contend that the crowdfunding campaign falls under § 364(a) or (b) because it
is, in effect, an attempt to obtain credit.176 In other words, the crowdfund creates
new debt for the estate in the form of both the rewards promised to backers, and
any monies spent procuring and providing those rewards should become estate

174
In re Kleibrink, 346 B.R. 734, 761 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that while a debt did exist, the
creditor’s failure to supply evidence of its existence prevented the Court from lifting the automatic stay).
175
11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2012).
176
§ 364(c) and (d) will not apply because Al’s will have no difficulty “obtaining” credit. Where, for
example, a bank may require § 364(c) or (d) protection as a condition of the loan, the crowdfund has no such
obligation.
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property regardless of their source. Courts have indeed recognized that “[d]ebt
need not be trade debt in order to qualify as [a] postpetition obligation incurred
‘in ordinary course of business.’”177
If the pledged rewards are a post-petition obligation, courts can allow
debtors to uphold their commitments by classifying them as administrative
expenses, which receive second priority under § 507.178 While backers would of
course prefer this priority status, unsecured creditors will rationally see it as a
shrinking of the pie, especially if the reorganization eventually fails and the
company is liquidated. Debtors will prefer to operate in § 364(a), which allows
taking unsecured credit as an administrative expense without court approval.
The court’s determination of whether the crowdfund falls within the ordinary
course of business would largely mirror the one analyzed with regards to § 363
in part III (C), supra. Further, some courts have focused only on the vertical
creditor expectation test with regards to § 364 (this analysis would also mirror
the one discussed supra).179
If the campaign is not within the ordinary course of business, the court will
hold a § 364(b) hearing.180 Creditors will use that hearing to persuade the judge
to either give priority to their own claims over the crowdfunding debts or to
disallow the campaign outright. However, the latter discussion may not be
necessary. If backers are pushed too far down the priority ladder, their rewards
will never be realized, and the campaign will likely be rendered unnecessary.
F. Plans Relying on Crowdfunding can be Feasible
A reorganization plan can pass the feasibility requirement of § 1129(a)(11).
The risk lurking behind any discussions of debtor crowdfunding is liquidation.
If a debtor encumbers itself with crowdfunding obligations and still ends up in
chapter 7, creditors will have lost time and opportunity cost while waiting for
the campaign to play out. Further, if things go poorly, paying for the
crowdfunding obligations may shrink the size of the estate. While courts should
be happy to provide debtors with more options to save themselves, there must
be limits to how much deference debtors-in-possession receive.

177

In re Poff Const., Inc., 141 B.R. 104, 106 (W.D. Va. 1991).
11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (2012).
179
See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 15.04 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.); cf. In
re Garofalo’s Finer Foods, 186 B.R. 414, 428 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“Section 364(a) does not require the court to
analyze industry wide practices to determine whether a particular transaction was within the debtor’s ordinary
course of business.”).
180
11 U.S.C. § 364(b) (2012).
178
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Once again, though, bankruptcy courts already have a tool at their disposal
to protect creditors in this position: § 1129(a)(11). This section conditions
confirmation of the plan on it being not likely to be “followed by the liquidation,
or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to
the debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed
in the plan.”181 In practice, this stipulation is known as the feasibility
assessment,182 although some courts have merged the doctrine into § 1129(a)(3),
which requires that a plan be proposed in good faith.183
“The purpose of section 1129(a)(11),” says Colliers, “is to prevent
confirmation of visionary schemes which promise[] creditors and equity security
holders more under a proposed plan than the debtor can possibly attain after
confirmation.”184 As a result, a guarantee of successful reorganization is not
necessary, and the threshold of proving a feasible plan is low.185
Under that most basic guideline, one would expect a crowdfund that is low
risk and trending towards completion to be confirmable. However, more specific
considerations will draw the court’s attention. These will include, for example,
whether the crowdfunding can provide adequate cash flow to meet continuing
obligations, or whether the crowdfunding will be able to supply a capital
infusion adequate to meet continuing obligations and allow continued operation.
The analysis will necessarily be fact heavy; for example, in In re Wetdog, LLC,
the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Georgia found that “as long as
the condition and appearance” of a Savannah Inn “[was] maintained to the
satisfaction of the rating agencies and advertising is adequate,” revenue would
be “automatic,” and the plan was therefore feasible.186 That same court came to
a different conclusion in In re HSD Partners, LLC, where it held that despite a

181
182

Id. § 1129(a)(11).
See Richard I. Aaron, The Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS

§ 12:14.
183
In re Pikes Peak Water Co., 779 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Not confirming the plan for lack
of good faith is appropriate particularly when there is no realistic possibility of an effective reorganization and
it is evident that the debtor seeks merely to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of secured creditors to enforce
their rights.”).
184
See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). The
classic case illustrating this point is (or at least should be) In re Trans Max Technologies, where then-Judge
Markell declined to confirm a plan that relied on the debtor company developing a flying car in three years
without incurring any debt. In re Trans Max Techs., Inc., 349 B.R. 80, 95 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006).
185
See In re Brotby, 303 B.R. 177, 192–93 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (Bankruptcy Court’s finding as to
feasibility of a plan relying on a 60-year-old computer programmer increasing his income 10% per year over 8
years was not clearly erroneous); In re Proud Mary Marina Corp., 338 B.R. 114, 132 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006)
(plan proponent not required to guarantee success, just reasonable assurance).
186
In re Wetdog, LLC, 518 B.R. 126, 137–38 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2014).
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debtor’s “draconian cost cutting attempts,” its revenue could not meet continued
operating needs and its plan was therefore unfeasible.187 Al’s revenue
projections based on the capital infusion therefore need to be realistic.
Other facts that a court may consider in the feasibility analysis may include:
(1) the adequacy of the debtor’s capital structure; (2) the earning power of the
business; (3) related economic conditions; (4) the ability of management; (5) the
probability of the continuation of the same management; and (6) any other
related matter which determines the prospects of a sufficiently successful
operation to enable performance of the provisions of the plan.188
In Al’s case, the debtors can show: (1) the crowdfund will add a minimal
amount of burden into the estate while adding significant, and needed, capital;
(2) the added capital will increase earning power by increasing efficiency and
seating capacity; (3) the state of both the local restaurant market and the
crowdfunding market as a whole are conducive to growth and capital formation,
respectively; (4) that Jones can successfully run his business under the plan; and
(5) that Jones will continue to do so. More than just bankruptcy policy supports
a finding of feasibility. If the court decides to confirm Al’s plan, the risks to
creditors are likely minimal. If the court holds that the plan is unfeasible, the
chilling effect upon both potential backers and potential crowdfunders, as
described supra in part III (A), may cause negative externalities for the
crowdfunding industry.
CONCLUSION
Small businesses can, and often do, fail for any number of reasons, be they
unpredictable, seemingly inconsequential, or downright bizarre. During the
writing of this Comment, in fact, two businesses outside of Emory University’s
front door closed for starkly different reasons. Casual restaurant Slice and Pint
shuttered after a competitor broke its local monopoly on both pizza and alcohol.
Two doors down, Daankbar Taco closed after its owner was charged with first
degree homicide by vehicle.189 Mentioning these misfortunes illustrates a point:
the small business world is fraught with danger.

187

In re HSD Partners, LLC, No. 10-40295, 2011 WL 7268051 3 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011).
See In re Sagewood Manor Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 223 B.R. 756, 763 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1998); In re Greate
Bay Hotel & Casino Inc., 251 B.R. 213, 226–27 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000).
189
Chris Fuhrmeister, Bad Dog Taqueria Owner Tracy Mitchell Charged in Fatal Hit-and-Run, EATER
ATLANTA (Nov.12, 2015), http://atlanta.eater.com/2015/11/12/9723962/tracy-mitchell-hit-and-run-bad-dogtaqueria-owner.
188
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The hope for this Comment’s proposed framework is for it to empower small
businesses, and the lawyers advising them, to have the confidence in the power
of the crowd. The crowd represents an immeasurable opportunity for anyone to
turn social capital into fiscal capital. Small businesses are uniquely situated to
take advantage of that opportunity, and courts should not interfere with such a
burgeoning market. Dialectics aside, capitalism works best when options are
plentiful for both consumers and producers.190 Just as Al’s customers benefit
from having multiple pizzerias in town, so does Al’s itself benefit from having
multiple ways in which to raise capital. Crowdfunding can serve as an avenue
for such a venture.
As both the Supreme Court191 and Congress192 have acknowledged, the law
can and should play a role in fostering competition. The same attitude should
prevail in the capital raising market.193 The passage of the JOBS Act signaled
that Congress has actively encouraged competition in the capital foundation
market. Further, the relatively low risks of non-equity crowdfunding make it a
prime candidate for a hands-off approach, both from regulators (as recognized
by the JOBS Act) and from the courts. Because law can foster trust, courts can
and indeed should try to protect the integrity of the crowdfunding system.
Bankruptcy courts can play their part in this crowdfunding push by ensuring
that backers are given every opportunity to receive the benefit of their bargain.
By using the options already presented to them within the Code, courts can do
so efficiently. More importantly, courts can give backers the chance to reap the
benefit of their bargain while remaining faithful to the Code’s twin aims of
rehabilitation and equitable distribution.
Bankruptcy courts already possess the means by which crowdfunding will
be assessed. Debtor businesses should be able to continue their crowdfunding
campaigns, if necessary, using the executory contract doctrine of § 365 or the
contingent interest concept found in § 541. Section 363 should provide an
avenue by which the debtor-in-possession can continue to crowdfund without
debtor interference, and § 364 can allow the debtor to uphold his end of the
bargain with regards to backer’s rewards. Perhaps most importantly,
190
Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition Always Good?, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 162, 162 (2013)
(“Promoting competition is broadly accepted as the best available tool for promoting consumer well-being.”).
191
Standard Oil Co v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our national economic policy long
has been faith in the value of competition”).
192
41 U.S.C. § 1705 (2012). (Government agencies must employ an officer responsible for “challenging
barriers to, and promoting full and open competition in, the procurement of property and services by the
executive agency.”).
193
See generally Stucke, supra note 190, at 62–63.
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reorganization plans predicated on a successful crowdfunding campaign can
satisfy the low expectations of § 1129(a)(11)’s feasibility requirement.
The fictional Al’s Pizza has served as means of simplifying this argument,
but its inclusion serves also to keep this Comment grounded. The goal of the
debtor, its creditors, backers, and the court should be to keep Al’s in business.
By affording Al’s the chance to complete the crowdfunding campaign,
bankruptcy courts can provide a low risk avenue to successfully reorganize. For
creditors, a successful campaign represents a significant step away from
liquidation. If there is a successful reorganization, Al’s can pay his creditors
more than they would have received in chapter 7, return to profitability, and
continue to provide the community with jobs. Just as well, if backers are allowed
to receive the rewards they paid for, confidence in the crowdfunding system will
increase. As the marketplace matures, other businesses will be able to use the
foundation laid by Al’s to tap into the crowd for their own needs. A successful
crowdfunding campaign is therefore an efficient solution to an otherwise costly
problem.
The problem of how to reorganize a crowdfunding business is new and
uncomfortable. The goal of this Comment was to provide courts and
practitioners with a means of understanding this problem. Ultimately, with
regards to crowdfunding and the Code, the wheel need not, and indeed should
not, be reinvented. Just as courts can find ways to analyze crowdfunding within
the limits of the Code, so too can they protect and foster the competitive nature
so inherent to crowdfunding. Debtor rehabilitation can be sought at the same
time as the integrity of the crowdfunding system is protected. Or, to bring things
nearly full circle, the madding crowd does not need a madding response.
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